Character, Choice, and "AberrantBehavior":
Aligning Criminal Sentencing with Concepts
of Moral Blame
RachaelA. Hillt
The United States Sentencing Guidelines aspire to create
uniformity in criminal sentencing by eradicating the effects of
discrimination, judicial idiosyncrasies, and biases in order to
promote fairness and justice. The idea is simple: similar cases
should be treated similarly. Sometimes, however, the rule-based
Guidelines create the opposite result: they give similar treatment
to cases with important differences. Legal norms cannot represent moral intuitions perfectly because moral intuitions necessarily vary according to facts and circumstances. Thus, situations
inevitably arise where the Guidelines call for a sentence substantially more severe than our moral intuitions tell us is necessary
or right.
In partial response to this problem, judges created a downward departure for "aberrant behavior" in order to address instances of diminished moral culpability. Courts use this departure to mitigate punishment for crimes representing a "single act
of aberrant behavior." The circuit courts disagree, however, on
how to define such an act. The majority of circuits holds that the
act must be "spontaneous and thoughtless" in order to qualify.' A
t B.- 1995, The University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1999, The University of Chicago.
1 See, for example, United States v Marcello, 13 F3d 752, 761 (3d Cir 1994) (holding
that structured currency transactions did not constitute a spontaneous and thoughtless
act); United States v Glick, 946 F2d 335, 338 (4th Cir 1991) (reversing a downward departure because transport of stolen trade secrets occurred on several occasions and involved
extensive planning); United States v Winters, 105 F3d 200, 207 (5th Cir 1997) (holding
that an officer's assault on an inmate was not spontaneous and thoughtless when he tried
to cover up his actions); United States v Carey, 895 F2d 318, 325 (7th Cir 1990) (holding
that a check-kiting scheme was not a single act of aberrant behavior because it involved
planning); United States v Garlich, 951 F2d 161, ,164 (8th Cir 1991) (concluding that defendant's planning and executing his financing scheme over a one year period was not
"spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless"); United States v Withrow, 85 F3d 527, 531
(11th Cir 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 332 (1996) (holding that armed theft of a car was not
aberrant behavior because defendant had time to consider act); United States v Dyce, 91
F3d 1462, 1470 (DC Cir 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 553 (1996) (noting that evidence suggests that there should be no aberrant behavior departure for a drug dealer who had ample opportunity to reconsider her decision to transport drugs). The status of the spontaneous and thoughtless test in the Eighth Circuit is somewhat uncertain in light of United
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minority of circuits has adopted a "totality of the circumstances"
approach, permitting sentencing courts to take into account factors such as the defendant's pecuniary gain, prior good deeds,
charitable activities, lack of criminal history or history of wrongful conduct, mitigation of the crime, mental illness, history of
steady 2employment, and history of economic support of his or her
family.
At the most fundamental level, the circuits disagree about
whether the Guidelines seek to punish an actor's choice or an actor's character. If the exercise of free will is a necessary condition
for a finding of moral blame, then courts should only grant a departure to those defendants who commit spontaneous and
thoughtless-and thus choiceless-acts. If character is the proper
measure of moral blame, however, courts should take a broader
approach in order to determine whether a particular defendant's
act expressed an underlying bad character.
This Comment argues that a character-based approach to
sentencing should be adopted and implemented, in part through
the downward departure for aberrant behavior. Part I describes
guideline sentencing and sketches the circuits' disagreement regarding the proper definition of aberrant behavior. Part II argues
that statutory language, the Guidelines Manual, and recent Supreme Court statements concerning the Guidelines provide
strong implicit support for a character-based approach to sentencing. Part II also demonstrates character theory's congruence
with widely accepted aims of criminal punishment. Part HI positions the circuits' disagreement regarding "aberrant behavior"
within the academic debate about choice versus character as the
appropriate measure of moral culpability. Finally, Part IV sets
forth a proposed definition of "aberrant behavior" that is consistent with a character-based approach to sentencing.

States v Kalb, 105 F3d 426, 429 n 2 (8th Cir 1997) (considering and leaving open the question of whether Koon v United States, 518 US 81 (1996), mandates expansion of the ma-

jority view).
2 See, for example, United States v Grandmaison, 77 F3d 555, 563 (1st Cir 1996)
(holding that determinations of "single act of aberrant behavior" should be based on the
totality of the circumstances); United States v Takai, 941 F2d 738, 743 (9th Cir 1991)
(same); United States v Tsosie, 14 F3d 1438, 1441-42 (10th Cir 1994) (same). Two circuits
have not defined "aberrant behavior." See United States v Altman, 48 F3d 96, 104 (2d Cir
1995) (stating that the Second Circuit has "not yet confronted the issue of 'single aberrant
act'); United States v Duerson, 25 F3d 376, 382 (6th Cir 1994) (stating that the court is
content to leave open the definition of a "single act" of aberrant behavior).
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I. THE DOWNWARD DEPARTURE FOR ABERRANT BEHAVIOR
A. Existing Case Law
The downward departure for aberrant behavior provides a
vehicle for judicial discretion within the rule-based system of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines, created by
the United States Sentencing Commission pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,' establish a uniform approach to
criminal punishment. Under the Guidelines, the sentencing court
identifies the level of the defendant's offense and calculates the
defendant's criminal history category.4 The intersection of the offense level and the criminal history category on a sentencing grid
yields the Guidelines' prescribed sentence range.5 As long as the
case is "ordinary," the court must impose a sentence within this
range.' The Commission recognized, however, a "vast range of
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision."7
Therefore, the Guidelines retain a key element of discretion:
to depart from the Guideline range in "unusual"
permission
8
cases.

Although the Guidelines themselves do not provide a comprehensive list of the types of unusual cases that might call for a
departure, courts have created several distinct categories. The
downward departure for aberrant behavior is one category that is
employed in all federal circuits. The aberrant behavior departure
originates from a passage in the Guidelines Manual in which the
Commission notes that it "has not dealt with the single acts of
aberrant behavior that still may justify probation at higher offense levels through departures. ' Although this statement refers
only to probation, courts have agreed that aberrant behavior may
also justify a sentence reduction."0 The circuits disagree, however,
on how to define a "single act of aberrant behavior." The majority
view requires that the criminal act be "spontaneous and
thoughtless." This view is followed by the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits." A minority of cirs Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1988, codified at 18 USC §§ 3551-3673, 28 USC §§ 991-98

(1994).

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 1BI.1 (Nov 1997)

("USSG").
'

Id.

Koon v UnitedStates, 518 US 81, 92 (1996).
USSG Ch 1, Pt A, intro comment 4b.
'Koon, 518 US at 92, citing USSG Ch 1, Pt A, intro comment 4b.
USSG Ch 1, Pt A, intro comment 4d (emphasis added).
"See UnitedStates v Duerson, 25 F3d 376, 380 (6th Cir 1994) (collecting cases).
" See note 1.
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cuits-the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits-has refused to adopt
this approach. Instead, they examine the "totality of the circumstances," including characteristics of both the actor and his act, in
deciding whether to depart.12
The majority view originated in United States v Carey," in
which the Seventh Circuit held that "[a] single act of aberrant
behavior... generally contemplates a spontaneous and thoughtless act rather than one which was the result of substantial planning." 14 The majority view considers the facts of an early First
Circuit case, United States v Russell,5 to be paradigmatic. In
Russell, the driver of an armored truck and his partner were mistakenly handed an extra $80,000 in cash. They kept the bag of
money for a week before confessing and returning it. 6 According
to the majority view, it is this type of behavior that may be properly classified as a single act of aberrant behavior.' As the Seventh Circuit explained, "Russell's actions were unplanned and
spontaneous; he was apparently overcome by the sudden intoxication of unexpected and immediate wealth."" In the Russell case
itself, the First Circuit believed that the facts warranted an "aberrant behavior" departure and remanded for clarification regarding whether the district court knew it had discretion to depart. 9 Though Russell serves as the majority view's model, the
First Circuit has since rejected the majority approach."
The majority's approach to sentencing focuses exclusively on
the defendant's capacity to exercise a reasoned choice to commit
the criminal act. The spontaneous and thoughtless standard rests
on the belief that "an act which occurs suddenly and is not the result of a continued reflective process is one for which the defendant may be arguably less accountable."' The majority view also
concludes that "one of the Sentencing Commission's primary
12

See note 2.

"895 F2d 318 (7th Cir 1990).
"Id at 325 (emphasis added).
"870 F2d 18 (1st Cir 1989). Though the majority uses the facts of Russell as its paradigm, the First Circuit has since rejected the majority approach. See United States v
Grandmaison, 77 F3d 555, 563 (1st Cir 1996) (employing a totality of the circumstances
test).
" Russell, 870 F2d at 19.
17 See, for example, Carey, 895 F2d at 325 (The facts of Russell present a paradigm
for
a single act of aberrant behavior even though the district court declined to depart in that
case.).
"Id.
"870 F2d at 21.
Grandmaison,77 F3d at 563. Of course, the majority's enthusiasm for Russell as the
paradigm case suggests that if the precise facts ofthe case were ever replicated, such a defendant would be entitled to a departure.
" Id at 562, quoting Carey, 895 F2d at 325.

1998]

AberrantBehavior

goals was to impose a sentence 'based upon the crime committed,
not the offender."' As a result, the majority approach requires
something more than a showing that the act was "out of character" before it will find that the defendant exhibited aberrant behavior.' The majority view thus attempts to focus exclusively on
the act itself and the defendant's choice to commit it. This interpretation of aberrant behavior comes close to nullifying the availability of the departure: no circuit court subscribing to the majority view has upheld a finding that a defendant's behavior was
sufficiently spontaneous and thoughtless to warrant a downward
departure.2
A minority of circuits-the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits-has rejected this constrained sentencing inquiry, electing
instead to examine the "totality of the circumstances" in deciding
whether to grant a departure for aberrant behavior.' This view
"place[s] considerable emphasis on a defendant's motivations and
any surrounding extenuating circumstances."26 In assessing the
totality of the circumstances, courts take into account factors
such as the defendants pecuniary gain, charitable activities,
prior good deeds, efforts to mitigate the crime, lack of previous
wrongdoing, mental illness, history of steady employment, history of economic support for his or her family, and other psychological and motivating factors. In essence, the minority view
holds that a departure is warranted when the defendant's behavior can be described as "a complete shock and out of character." Courts adopting the minority view usually define "out of
character" relative to the defendant's previous conduct; some,
however, define it relative to the behavior of other offenders
committing the same offense. 29 Under either definition, the mi"United States v Brewer, 899 F2d 503, 507 (6th Cir 1990), citing United States v MejiaOrosco,867 F2d 216, 218 (5th Cir 1989).
" United States v Williams, 974 F2d 25, 26 (5th Cir 1992).
See note 1.
See note 2. Although the Ninth Circuit initially led the totality of the circumstances
pack, the court has shifted toward a spontaneous and thoughtless approach. See United
States v Pierson, 121 F3d 560, 564-65 (9th Cir 1997) (applying Carey and declining to depart); United States v Green, 105 F3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir 1997) ("While we have not required that the behavior be a single spontaneous or thoughtless act involving no planning,
we have to some extent relied on the concept of 'singularity or spontaneity.'"), citing
United States v Lam, 20 F3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir 1994).
Green, 105 F3d at 1323.
Grandmaison, 77 F3d at 563 (listing factors); United States v Lam, 20 F3d 999,
1003-05 (9th Cir 1994) (same); United States v Fairless, 975 F2d 664, 667-68 (9th Cir
1992) (same); United States v Tsosie, 14 F3d 1438, 1441-42 (10th Cir 1994) (same).
Tsosie, 14 F3d at 1441.
Compare Tsosie, 14 F3d at 1441 ("The totality of circumstances must be viewed to
see whether the offense fits within [the defendant's] normal conduct or if it is a complete

980

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:975

nority view involves a wider scope of inquiry in the downward
departure decision because it permits courts to consider aspects
of the actor's character and previous history as well as his act.
B. The Connection Between the Aberrant Behavior Split and
Competing Notions of Moral Blame
At first glance, the proper definition of aberrant behavior
might seem to be a minor and peripheral issue-a simple debate
about the appropriate legal standard to be applied in a relatively
small number of cases. Upon further examination, however, the
problem emerges as a more complex and fundamental issue. The
Sentencing Commission's decision to couple the rule-based
Guidelines with judicial discretion to depart indicates that the
Guidelines seek to accomplish something more than to punish the
criminal act itself. After all, if mere conduct is a complete indicator of blameworthiness, then a simple sentencing grid produces
perfect results. What, then, is this "something more"? The two
distinct approaches to the aberrant behavior issue suggest two
possible answers: either the Guidelines seek to punish choice, or
they seek to punish character.
The majority view assesses spontaneity and thoughtlessness,
apparently gauging the actor's capacity to exercise reasoned
choice. In the majority's view the Guidelines are motivated by the
belief that actors are criminally responsible for the acts they
freely choose to undertake but not for acts they lack either the
capacity or the opportunity to avoid doing. 0 In contrast, the minority's consideration of psychological and motivating factors indicates an assumption that the Guidelines intend to punish
something about the actor himself-namely, his character. These
courts apparently believe that actors are criminally responsible
only for those actions that express a morally reprehensible character trait.3 Within the character-based approach there is yet an-

shock and out of character."), with United States v Delvalle, 967 F Supp 781, 784 (E D NY
1997) (granting a departure under a totality of the circumstances approach after finding
the defendant's conduct aberrant both in comparison to other offenders and to his own
previous conduct). See also United States v Takai, 941 F2d 738, 744 (9th Cir 1991) (holding that the defendants' behavior in attempting to bribe an INS official was aberrant in
comparison to the "usual undercover case").
' For discussions of choice-based approaches to culpability, see R-AL Duff, Choice,
Character,and Criminal Liability, 12 L & Phil 345, 346-47 (1993); Michael S. Moore,
Choice, Character,and Excuse, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol 29, 29 (1990).
" For discussions of character-based approaches to culpability, see Duff, 12 L & Phil
at 362-63; Peter Arenella, Character,Choice, and MoralAgency: The Relevance of Character to our Moral CulpabilityJudgments, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol 59, 81 (1990); Michael D. Bayles, Character,Purpose, and CriminalResponsibility, 1 L & Phil 5, 7 (1982).
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other possible division. Most courts applying the minority approach seem to believe character can be measured by "settled
dispositions," components of an actor's character that exist independently of the criminal act." These might include prior good
deeds and support for family. However, another more limited
conception of character is possible-one that looks only to the
emotions and motivations behind the criminal act itself.
If the majority is correct that the Guidelines seek to punish
choice, then spontaneous and thoughtless is a sensible definition
for aberrant behavior, because it focuses the judicial inquiry directly on the actor's capacity for rational choice. If, however, the
Guidelines intend to punish the actor's character, the inquiry
must go beyond spontaneous and thoughtless in order to reach a
wider range of the actor's personal characteristics and motivations. This character-based approach might resemble the totality
of the circumstances approach of the minority. Reaching consensus on the proper definition of aberrant behavior, then, requires
an understanding of the Guidelines' basic conception of moral
blame-namely, whether the Guidelines seek to punish an actor's
choice or the actor himself.
Statutory language, the Guidelines Manual, and Supreme
Court statements concerning the nature of the Guidelines do not
explicitly endorse either choice or character as the proper measure of moral culpability. They do, however, provide strong implicit support for a character-based approach. Furthermore, using
character as the touchstone of moral fault accords squarely with
the commonly accepted aims of criminal punishment, now codified by Congress for use as the proper purpose of the Guidelines.
I1. SUPPORT FOR A CHARACTER-BASED APPROACH
TO SENTENCING

Language in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, the Guidelines Manual, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence supports
a character-based approach to criminal sentencing. The theoretical underpinnings of criminal punishment also favor a characterbased approach. Although neither Congress, the Sentencing
Commission, nor the Supreme Court explicitly endorses any
measure of moral fault,33 a character-based approach appears to
be most congruent with the current sentencing regime.

See notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity,91 Nw U L Rev 1336, 1336
(1997) ("For all the sophistication they display, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines also re-

flect a defiant atheoreticality").
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Statutory Language, the Guidelines Manual, and Koon

Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Supreme
Court each have provided considerable support for a characterbased approach to sentencing.' In the act that established the
Sentencing Commission, Congress directed federal district courts
to focus on "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant."' The Commission
itself has stated that, when considering a departure from a
Guidelines-prescribed sentence, "the court may consider, without
limitation, any information concerning the background, character
and conduct of the defendant."" The Commission has also explained that its decision to permit discretionary upward and
downward departures stemmed from a recognition that "it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that encompasses the
vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing
decision."" These official pronouncements deliberately eschew a
strictly act-based inquiry at the sentencing phase, favoring instead a broader approach that includes considerations of character.
During the first decade of the Guidelines' use, however, some
courts expressed what Professor Albert Alschuler has called "a
common misperception" about the Sentencing Guidelines,8
namely, that "[o]ne of Congress' primary purposes in establishing
the Guidelines was.., to rest sentences upon the offense committed, not upon the offender."39 This perception has been used to
justify the majority approach to the aberrant behavior departure.4" Yet Congress specifically charged the Commission with
creating a system of punishment that would consider both the act
and the offender. Therefore, if the Guidelines require courts to
consider only the offense, then "a serious question would arise

"See also Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaun, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 Colum L Rev 269, 369 (1996) (pointing to "a long moral and legal tradition" that holds "that we owe it to the dignity and humanity of the defendant to let the entire history appear").
18 USC § 3553(a)(1).
USSG § 1B1.4.
USSG Ch 1, Pt A, intro comment 4b.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines:A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U Chi L Rev 901, 910 (1991).
Id, quoting UnitedStates v McHan, 920 F2d 244, 247 (4th Cir 1990). See also United
States v Brewer, 899 F2d 503, 507 (6th Cir 1990) (Guidelines require courts to focus on offense.); United States v Mejia-Orosco, 867 F2d 216, 218 (5th Cir 1989) (The punishment
should fit the crime, not the offender.).
See note 22 and accompanying text.
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whether the Guidelines must be struck down for failure to conform to the governing statute."4 '
The Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Koon v United States4 s
confirmed that the "act only" understanding of the Guidelines
was indeed a serious misperception. In a portion of the Koon
opinion that was joined by all nine Justices, the Court clarified
the correct focus of the sentencing inquiry:
[T]he Guidelines provide uniformity, predictability, and a
degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system. This too
must be remembered, however. It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing
judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and
every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the
punishment to ensue.'
Koon deflects the assumption that the Guidelines are wholly actbased-an assumption the majority of courts use to substantiate
adherence to spontaneous and thoughtless as the proper definition of aberrant behavior.
Furthermore, in Koon the Court directed the district court to
"make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in
criminal sentencing."' Only a character-based approach, which
takes account of emotional motivation, can encompass such
breadth of analysis. The choice-based approach limits the sentencing judge to deciding whether the defendant lacked the capacity or opportunity for rational choice. In contrast, the character-based approach permits the sentencing judge to fully examine
"the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue." 5 Therefore, Koon
seems incompatible with a choice-based understanding of Guidelines sentencing on two fronts.46
UnitedStates v Rodriguez, 724 F Supp 1118, 1120 (S D NY 1989).
518 US 81 (1996).
Id at 113 (emphasis added).
"Id at 98.
42

4 Id at 113.

"Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has suggested a third conflict between Koon and the
"spontaneous and thoughtless" standard. See United States v Kalb, 105 F3d 426 (8th Cir
1997). Koon requires a two-step inquiry before departure: first, whether the given factor is
encouraged or merely "unmentioned,' and second, if the factor is unmentioned, whether
the facts of the case take it outside the "heartland" of ordinary cases. Koon, 518 US at 96.
According to the Eighth Circuit, assessing only spontaneity and thoughtlessness might be
an impermissibly narrow "heartland" inquiry. See Kalb, 105 F3d at 429 & n 2.
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B. Character and the Aims of Punishment
Using character as the measure of moral blame also comports closely with long-accepted rationales for the imposition of
criminal punishment. Commentators typically identify the four
major aims of punishment as retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.4' When Congress created the United
States Sentencing Commission and charged the Commission with
creating the Sentencing Guidelines, it codified these same rationales as the proper factors to be considered by the sentencing
judge. Specifically, Congress stated:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider.., the need for the sentence imposed(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. 4
A character-based approach to sentencing ensures that treatment
of the individual offender satisfies all four major aims of punishment. A choice-based approach, however, fails to meet all four
goals consistently.
1.

Retribution.

Retribution requires that punishment be just, reflecting the
actor's desert and the seriousness of his offense. A character inquiry enables judges to make more accurate determinations
about desert. Under a character-based approach to sentencing,
even if two actors have performed identical acts, the character of
one actor may make him more deserving of punishment than the
other. Though at least one choice theorist argues that it is inappropriate to punish two actors differently for similar acts, 49 basic

moral intuitions suggest otherwise. Consider two actors, A and B,
both of whom have killed another human being. A made an ago41 See, for example, Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, CriminalLaw and
its Processes: Cases and Materials 101-31 (Little, Brown 6th ed 1995); Kent Greenawalt,
Punishment, in Sanford H. Kadish, ed, 4 Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice 1336-45
(MacMllan 1983).
18 USC § 3553(a).
41 See Benjamin B. Sendor, The Relevance of Conduct and Characterto Guilt and Punishment, 10 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol 99, 129-30 (1996) (arguing that "in criminal
law, desert entails a judgment based upon conduct... not a judgment about character").
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nizing choice to shoot his own father, who was suffering from a
terminal illness and wished to die. B, on the other hand, shot an
African-American neighbor out of racial hatred. Whatever one's
view about the morality of euthanasia, society's impulse is to
punish those who kill out of mercy less than those who kill out of
hate. This impulse is reflected in the doctrines of excuse and justification, which prescribe diminished punishment in cases of diminished moral culpability. For example, the criminal law punishes those who are motivated to act out of necessity or under duress less severely than those who are not. Retributive urges are
variable, based on both the core conduct involved in committing
the offense and the emotions and motivations driving the act.
Therefore, a character-based approach to sentencing serves the
goal of retribution better than a choice-based approach.
2.

Deterrence.

At first glance, deterrence may seem to be a trickier fit for
the character theorist, because pure deterrence thinking is closely
tied to choice theory. Nevertheless, a character-based approach to
sentencing will provide adequate amounts of both specific and
general deterrence. More importantly, it will deter the "right"
people.
Focusing the sentencing inquiry on character satisfies the
demands of specific deterrence. Commentators agree that the
criminal law regime attempts to replicate closely society's notions
of moral blame.' ° Thus, the criminal law should, and usually does,
operate to punish only the morally "bad." Conversely, because legal norms reflect moral norms, people with morally "good" characters only rarely do things that are legally "bad." Such cases occur only in the gap between moral and legal norms; if the criminal law operates properly, this gap ought to be very narrow. Consequently, if the overwhelming majority of "bad" acts are committed by "bad" people, the chance that a morally "good" person will
repeat his legally "bad" behavior is lower than the chance that a
See, for example, Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 30 (cited in note 30) (observing a very
tight connection between morality and legality in the criminal law); Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil
& Pol at 61 (cited in note 31) ("One ofthe major distinctions between the criminal law and
other legal methods of constraining people's behavior is that a criminal conviction often
conveys a message of moral as well as legal censure."); Sanford H. Kadish, Blame and
Punishment: Essays in the Criminal Law 87 (MacMillan 1987) ("[Clriminal conviction
charges a moral fault."); George Vuoso, Note, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96
Yale L J 1661, 1663 (1987) ("Only a criminal law that incorporated to some extent the morality of the society it was supposed to serve, could hope to endure and effectively achieve
general deterrence and the other societal benefits that are thought to justify criminal .
punishment.).
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"bad" person will. By punishing only those people motivated by
their "bad" characters, courts can ensure that criminal sentences
specifically deter precisely those people who most need to be deterred from future criminal conduct.
The aim of general deterrence-using the defendant to set an
example in order to dissuade misconduct by others-is also tied
to a choice-based approach to sentencing. Future actors can only
alter their chosen behavior; therefore, punishing an actor for
choosing to behave badly encourages others to choose to behave
well. However, this link between general deterrence and choice
theory does not exclude the possibility that a character-based approach might have similar deterrent effects. In fact, if actors can
evaluate the quality of their own motivations, optimal general deterrence ought to be achieved under a character-based approach.
A "bad" person will be deterred by the punishment given to other
"bad" actors. Proponents of choice as the proper measure of moral
fault might argue that people are not good at self-identification,
and that optimal deterrence will not obtain whenever "bad" people misidentify their own motivations as "good." While it is true
that actors may be deluded as to the intrinsic moral quality of
their own actions, the proper measuring stick for the future actor
is society's valuation of the given motivation, not the actor's
valuation. An actor planning to commit a hate crime, for example,
will observe the differentiation between the punishment given to
actors A and B in the earlier example. Even though this third actor, C, might believe that killing a member of another race is as
morally justified as killing one's father out of mercy, C will recognize that society labels the former action as more morally reprehensible than the latter. C will self-identify with B, and A's reduced punishment ought not diminish the resultant deterrent effect.
Furthermore, even if a self-identification problem does exist,
the decrease in general deterrence is likely to be quite slim.. The
"good" people with whom the "bad" actor wrongly self-identifies
do not avoid punishment entirely; they are just punished less.
Judge Posner has pointed out that marginal differences in deterrence arising from criminal sentences can be very small.5 ' This
slight slippage in general deterrence is more than justified by the
efficiency gains in specific deterrence and the clear superiority of
the character-based approach over choice as a means of fulfilling
the other major aims of punishment.
51 See

curring).

United States v Jackson, 835 F2d 1195, 1199-1200 (7th Cir 1987) (Posner con-
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Social Protection and Rehabilitation.

A character-based approach to sentencing also provides the
appropriate level of social protection. Again, the parallel between
moral and legal norms means that "good" people are less likely
than "bad" people to commit dangerous or undesirable acts in the
future.52 A choice-based approach, on the other hand, is more
likely to punish "good" people too severely by treating them the
same as the "bad" people who pose a more serious danger to the
public. Similarly, character theory furthers the rehabilitative aim
of punishment because "good" people are "good" and do not need
to become "good" through "educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment."53 Using character
at the sentencing phase ensures that society expends its resources primarily on those from whom it most wants to be protected and who need the most rehabilitative help. A choice-based
approach cannot make such distinctions.
In short, character theory's congruence with the aims of
punishment, along with statements from Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Supreme Court, strongly support a
character-based approach to criminal sentencing. Because neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has explicitly approved this approach, however, it is helpful to consider the contributions of
criminal law theorists. The next Part analyzes the ongoing
choice-character debate and endorses character theory as a superior measure of moral fault.
Ill.

THE ACADEMIC DEBATE: CHOICE VERSUS CHARACTER

Because Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and the Supreme Court have failed to resolve conclusively the choicecharacter question, the issue remains open for academic discussion. Indeed, there exists a lively and ongoing debate regarding
which of the two competing notions of moral culpability ought to
govern understandings of the entire body of criminal law. 4
See Sendor, 10 Notre Dame J L, Ethics & Pub Pol at 128 (cited in note 49) ("An offender's bad or good character plainly is an appropriate sentencing criterion for the purpose of incapacitating an offender.").
18 USC § 3553(a)(2)(D). See also Sendor, 10 Notre Dame J L Ethics & Pub Pol at
129 (cited in note 49) ("The rehabilitative function of punishment clearly requires the use
of a defendants character as a criterion of punishment.").
The debate between these two competing conceptions has been waged on both positive and normative grounds. Lately, character and choice theorists have focused on describing and explaining legal excuses and justifications such as insanity, duress, and mistake. While character and choice theorists agree that the criminal law does and should use
these doctrines to recognize diminished culpability in certain circumstances, they disagree
about whether it is the lack of free choice or the absence of bad character that best ex-
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A. Choice Theory
Choice theory derives from Kant's belief in the will as the
source of human morality.55 Blackstone applied this concept to
the criminal law, arguing that legal excuses can be "reduced to
this single consideration, the want or defect of will." Ihe theory's first major modern proponent was H.L.A. Hart, who wrote
that excuses "reflect, albeit imperfectly, a fundamental principle
of morality that a person is not to be blamed for what he has done
if he could not help doing it."5" According to Hart, assigning moral
blame to an actor is fair and just only when the actor has both
the capacity and the fair opportunity to conform to the law. 8 As
long as the actor's behavior is chosen freely, however, the actor is
morally responsible for his acts.
Choice theory has strong connections to deterrence.59 If actors
know that they will be legally responsible for deliberately
breaching moral norms, they will choose not to breach them in
order to avoid punishment. ° Choice theorists, however, also
ground the theory in basic fairness ideals that function as moral
side-constraints on the purely utilitarian goal of minimizing
crime in any cost-effective manner.6 In Hart's words, these are
constraints that "civilized moral thought place[s] on the pursuit
of the utilitarian goal by the demand that punishment should not
be applied to the innocent."62 In this context, the innocent are
those actors who could not have chosen otherwise. "Could not,"
however, is loosely defined: an actor's choice to obey the legal
plains and justifies the concept of reduced culpability. This dispute parallels the debate
over the correct definition of aberrant behavior. It therefore applies with equal force to the
sentencing phase of criminal adjudication.
See Duff, 12 L & Phil at 346 (cited in note 30); Bayles, 1 L & Phil at 6 (cited in note
31).
Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 32 (cited in note 30), quoting Sir William Blackstone, 4
Commentarieson the Laws of England 20 (Chitty ed 1826).
,H.L.A. Hart, Punishmentand Responsibility 174 (Oxford 1968).
Id at 201.
See text accompanying notes 47-48.
See Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 33 (cited in note 30) ("[Only my free choices will be
sanctioned, and knowing that, I can maximally predict what will follow upon my decisions."); Duff, 12 L & Phil at 347 (cited in note 30) (citing Hart for the point that a choicebased approach to the measurement of moral blame results in rational choice maximization).
" Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 33 (cited in note 30) (citing Hart for the proposition that
the choice principle originates from considerations of fairness and justice); Duff, 12 L &
Phil at 347 (cited in note 30) ("Only [my choices] are properly mine as a responsible agent,
since only they are within my control.). See also Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 62 (cited
in note 31) ("[U]tilitarian theorists ... treat[ ] the moral responsibility requirement as a
useful side-constraint on the law's goal of crime-prevention.").
"Hart, Punishment and Responsibility at 80 (cited in note 57).
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norm need not have been completely impossible, but merely very
difficult.' This difficulty can be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the
actor. Lack of capacity to choose includes intrinsic factors such as
insanity, and lack of fair opportunity may describe external circumstances." In either case, the actor's excuse or justification
stems exclusively from an inability to exercise unfettered choice.
B.

Character Theory

The character theory of criminal responsibility derives, at
least in part, from the work of David Hume, who located "personal character" as the situs of moral blame.' According to character theory, criminal actions serve as a lens through which to
view an actor's character traits. If a particular action expresses
bad character, the actor is morally blameworthy. However, the
occasional gap between legal and moral norms may lead to a false
inference from act to character. In such cases, the actor cannot be
shown to have a bad character and, therefore, deserves less (or
no) moral blame.' For example, a law against killing covers, on
its face, both sadistic serial murderers and those who kill in selfdefense, even though society considers actors in the latter category to be less morally culpable. In cases such as this, where no
connection exists between act and bad character, the lack of mens
rea, or the presence of an excuse or justification, blocks the inference linking the criminal act to bad character. Character theory
seeks to identify these gaps between legal and moral norms in order to perfect character inferences and mete out moral blame accordingly.
Some character theorists take a broad, "settled dispositions"
approach to character, arguing that moral blame attaches according to the actor's established character traits as evidenced by
a pattern of action over time.' Most, however, are careful to reMoore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 34-35 (cited in note 30) (arguing for a compatible reading of "could not have done otherwise" that embraces situations where choice is very difficult).
See id at 35 (describing Hart's bifurcation of capacity and opportunity as a distinction between the actor's "equipment' and the actor's situation).
See Duff, 12 L & Phil at 361 & n 49 (cited in note 30); Bayles, 1 L & Phil at 7 (cited
in note 31).
See Du% 12 L & Phil at 363 (cited in note 30) ("[A defendant] is convicted if and because his action warranted an inference to an undesirable character-trait; it is that character-trait which the law condemns and punishes."); Bayles, 1 L & Phil at 7 (cited in note
31) ("If an act does indicate an undesirable character trait, then blame is appropriate; if it
does not, then blame is inappropriate.").
' See, for example, Bayles, 1 L & Phil at 7 (cited in note 31) ('[Character trait] refers
to any socially desirable or undesirable disposition of a person."); Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: PoliticalPrinciplesand Community Values 68 (Routledge 1988) ("[I]t is unfair to
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ject this behavioral approachs' in favor of a narrower, motivational inquiry.6 9 The settled dispositions approach fails because it
generates an account of criminal responsibility that is at once
"too rich"7" and inherently unreliable. The criminal law is illequipped to undertake a complex psychological analysis of moral
qualities and tendencies expressed over the course of an actor's
entire life. Moreover, such evidence ought to have little bearing
on intuitions regarding the appropriate amount of moral blame
attaching to a particular criminal act. As Professor R.A. Duff explains:
What makes a person's action 'out of character' in the relevant sense is not its inconsistency with what he has shown
in other contexts to be his settled dispositions, but that it
does not manifest 'character' at all: it does not, that is, manifest the kind of valuational and motivational structure of attitudes and practical reasoning in which a person's 'character,' as an object of moral or criminal appraisal, consists.7
For example, in forming intuitions about blame in the hypothetical involving A and B, it is A's merciful motives and B's racist
ones that matter most. Evidence of A's history of convenience
store robbery or B's involvement with various charities should
hold no sway, even if they tell us something about "character" in
a broader sense. When "motivational" character theorists assess
character, they look to the emotions and motivations underlying
the criminal act itself, because only a motivational analysis provides an accurate measurement of moral blame.
C. Character Theory as a More Complete Account of
Moral Blame
Character theory is superior to choice theory because it recognizes that some human emotions and motivations are not chosen, and yet are still morally blameworthy. According to character theorists, choice theory is not completely wrong; rather, it is
hold people responsible for actions which are out of character, but only fair to hold them so
for actions in which their settled dispositions are centrally expressed.).
'See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 78-79 (cited in note 31) (describing as "outmoded"
the behavioral view of character as a description of a person's past acts or settled dispositions); Duff, 12 L & Phil at 368 (cited in note 30) ("IT]he criminal process is radically illsuited to serve as an inquiry into the subtler depths of a defendanfs moral character, nor
is an inquiry the law's proper business.").
See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 79 (cited in note 31) (endorsing a motivational
view of character); Duff, 12 L & Phil at 378 (cited in note 30) (same).
" Duff, 12 L & Phil at 368 (cited in note 30).
Id at 378 (emphasis added).
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"thin" or "inadequate." 2 Choice theory's narrow focus on volition
and reason fails sufficiently to take account of other human processes." While character theorists define themselves in opposition
to choice theorists, they also recognize an "intimate link" between
character and choice.74 Character is evidenced most clearly by the
types of choices an actor makes.7" Professor Peter Arenella augments choice-based analysis by examining the source and content
of the actor's goals, desires, values, and emotions as well as their
bearing on moral agency.7 6 As Duff explains, this type of inquiry
sets the action "in the wider and deeper context of thought, attitudes, and motivation that gives it its meaning." 7
Choice theorists, however, recognize that a concept of moral
responsibility that ignores most human emotions and motivations
is inherently inadequate. They have attempted to remedy this
problem without conceding the superiority of the character-based
approach. In response to the problem that some forces that constrain choice do not justify committing crimes, Professor Michael
Moore, a choice theorist, posits that some emotions are part of the
actor himself. These emotions cannot be seen as external forces
that constrain, and therefore excuse, an actor's choice to commit a
crime. Moore gives the example of an individual, D2. D2 unjustiflably hates another individual, X, who is, by all accounts, a wonderful person. X is dying but can be saved by a rare drug possessed by T. T knows of D2's hatred for X and tries to force D2 to
rob a bank by threatening to give X the drug. D2 does not want to
rob the bank but is overcome by the thought of X's continued existence. He therefore agrees to help T.7' Under a simple choicebased approach, D2 may qualify for a duress excuse. He fears X's
continued existence just as another actor might fear harm to his
family. This fear incapacitates his ability to choose; therefore, he
is not culpable. According to Moore, however, this answer is be-

' See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 64 (cited in note 31) ("thin"); Duff, 12 L & Phil at
361-62 (cited in note 30) ("inadequate").
"See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 64 (cited in note 31); Duff, 12 L & Phil at 361-62

(cited in note 30).
' See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 61 (cited in note 31). See also Duff, 12 L & Phil at
380 (cited in note 30) ("What makes a person criminally liable is... not 'choice' as distinct
from 'character'; nor 'character' as distinct from 'choice' or action: but a wrongful action
which, as the action of a responsible moral agent, manifests in and by itself some inappropriate attitude towards the law and the values it protects."). See also note 66.
7' See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 74 (cited in note 31); Duff, 12 L & Phil at 371-72

(cited in note 30).
"See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 61 (cited in note 31).
Duff, 12 L & Phil at 372 (cited in note 30).

Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 36-37 (cited in note 30).
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lied by "[c]ommon intuition."79 This intuition "should incline the
choice theorist strongly toward Freud's view: some emotions, at
least, have to be included within the self who chooses. D2's hatred
of X is part of him; it cannot be seen as an alien factor that incapacitates him from deciding whether or not to rob the bank.' °
Anticipating the character theorists' response, Moore says
that "[s]uch an extended view of self may seem unavailable on the
choice theory of responsibility, for it may seem that to hold people
like D2 responsible for their actions requires a prior judgement
holding them responsible for being who they are." Moore answers in a conclusory fashion. Without explaining how an extended view of self can be reconciled with choice theory, Moore
simply states that it can: "Choice, to be morally interesting, must
include not only the initiation of basic actions but also the formation of the intentions and beliefs that guide and motivate the doing of basic actions." 2 But when Moore tries to bring emotions
and human motivations within the purview of choice theory, the
result is not choice theory at all.' Instead, Moore is left with precisely the kind of character-based approach he set out to discredit.
Not surprisingly, Moore encounters difficulty when he applies what he maintains is choice theory to the case of D2 in a way
that distinguishes the analysis from one overtly based on character. Deciding to leave the issue open, Moore refuses to grapple
with the question of whether emotions such as D2's hatred can be
said to incapacitate choice.' Instead, Moore focuses his attention
on the "lack of fair opportunity" strand of choice theory, arguing
that D2 does not lack fair opportunity to conform to the legal
norm because he does not face an "objectively regarded" evil if he
does conform.' In other words, D2 is not excused for committing a
crime in order to prevent X's survival, because X's survival is not
an evil to society but rather a benefit (especially because X is a
wonderful person). Moore does not, however, explain how to determine whether an outcome is objectively evil. How do we know
Xs survival is a good thing? More importantly, how do we know
D2 is morally wrong to hate X? Measuring objective evilness presupposes an inquiry into D2's character. Arenella makes this

9Id at 37.
0Id at 37-38.
8' Id at 38.
2Id.

See Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 80 (cited in note 31).
Moore, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 39-40 (cited in note 30).
Id at 40.
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point when he notes that Moore's criterion of objective evil does
nothing more than serve as a "proxy for evaluating whether the
individual's succumbing to the threat reflected a morally objectionable character trait for which we hold the agent morally responsible.'
Arenella also points out that even the basic form of choice
theory contains a certain disguised acceptance of the characterbased approach. For example, imagine an extremely irascible
person, E. E is walking down the street when another person, F,
accidentally bumps his shoulder as they pass. True to his nature,
E becomes inflamed. Without thinking, he pulls out a gun and
shoots F to death. Under a strict application of choice theory, E
ought to be excused, because his excessive anger made the choice
not to kill F very difficult. This is a perverse result 7 that the law
anticipates and avoids. In order to qualify for excuses such as
provocation and duress, an actor must behave as a reasonable
person or a person of reasonable firmness. Choice theory, however, "does not explain how.., the choice theorist's minimalist
account of a moral agent's necessary attributes can generate this
capacity" to behave reasonably.' Using a hypothetical reasonable
person as a baseline introduces a concealed character judgment
into the choice-based approach. As with Moore's "objectively regarded as evil" test, a reasonable person standard requires courts
to assess whether an actor's reaction to a perceived threat or affront reveals a character trait that is undesirable according to society's standards. When an actor behaves unreasonably, he expresses a bad character and is, therefore, morally blameworthy.
When an actor acts as a reasonable person would, he does not reveal a bad character and is excused. These examples show that
whenever choice theorists attempt to. give their theory more explanatory power, they lapse into a character-based inquiry.
IV. DEFINING ABERRANT BEHAVIOR TO REFLECT A CHARACTER-

BASED APPROACH TO SENTENCING
Commentators have focused on defending character theory
as an explanation and justification for the concept of criminal reArenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 78 (cited in note 31).
"See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colun L Rev at 307-08 (cited in note 34) ("A rule that
focused only on impairment of volition would thus risk getting things entirely backwards;
it would show more solicitude toward the 'proud, or captious, or selfish or habitually illnatured man'--who by any sort of indulgence, fault, or vice, renders himself very easily
excitable, or very subject to temptation'-than it would toward the 'moderate, welltempered, and orderly citizen.") (citations omitted).
" Arenella, 7:2 Soc Phil & Pol at 70-71 (cited in note 31).
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sponsibility. Because both criminal responsibility and the appropriateness of punishment depend on a finding of blame, character
theory is also the most complete and coherent approach to criminal punishment. Character theory's superiority is borne out by
the implicit support for a character-based approach to sentencing
in the Sentencing Guidelines, and in legislative and Supreme
Court statements about the Guidelines. To implement a character-based approach fully, however, courts must base their definition of aberrant behavior on a motivational understanding of
character theory. Currently, neither the majority's spontaneous
and thoughtless test nor the minority's totality of the circumstances approach represents a truly character-based sentencing

inquiry.
A. Rejecting the Choice-Based Majority View
The majority view regarding the proper definition of aberrant
behavior constitutes an attempt to apply choice theory to criminal
sentencing. Like choice theory generally, however, this choicebased approach to sentencing is an inherently inadequate and
misleading account of moral culpability. Moral intuitions about
blame and punishment depend on much more than a simple assessment of choice. In fact, a finding of spontaneity and thoughtlessness may be more consistent with increased, rather than decreased, moral blame. On this score, Duff argues that:
It would be absurd to argue that we should not be morally or
criminally liable for our weak-willed actions; and such actions surely reflect relevant character-traits. They show
something about the nature and depth of our commitment to
the values they flout; they show that we lack the moral
strength to resist temptations that a more virtuous person
would resist-or would not even be tempted by. 9
Take, for example, the Russell defendant. The majority of circuits
considered his behavior to be spontaneous and thoughtless, and
the First Circuit considered it possibly aberrant within the
meaning of the departure." Russell made a split-second decision
to keep $80,000 that did not belong to him; he returned the
money a week later. While Russell might not be a hardened
criminal, it is not clear that we must blame him less for the immediacy of his decision to steal. Isn't it possible that his heedless
action actually revealed a greater moral culpability? Would we
Duff, 12 L & Phil at 376 (cited in note 30).
See text accompanying notes 15-20.
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blame another actor more because she deliberated about a decision to become a thief, weighing her moral qualms against a need
to, for example, feed her children? The majority view makes these
judgments ahead of time and in the abstract, endowing the actor's speed of decision with a privileged moral status and excluding from consideration all other potentially relevant factors. 91
B. Rejecting the "Settled Dispositions" Minority View
Although the minority's totality of the circumstances approach avoids the narrowness of the majority approach, it too
must be rejected. Most of the courts taking the minority position
have adopted an overly broad understanding of character that
encompasses both an actor's settled dispositions and his motivations for the specific criminal act in question. A character-based
approach to the aberrant behavior departure entails an expansive
analysis that reaches beyond choice in order to fully capture
moral intuitions about blame and punishment. But the minority
view goes too far. These courts use the totality of the circumstances test to give moral credit to defendants who previously led
exemplary lives.92
A properly constructed character-based approach ought only
identify gaps between legal and moral norms; that is, when the
Guidelines-mandated sentence attached to a criminal act is out of
step with moral blame in a particular instance. "Settled dispositions"-prior good deeds, support of family, lack of previous misbehavior-do not have the same intrinsic connection to moral
blame as do the emotions and motivations underlying the criminal act itself. These characteristics of the actor are temporally
and causally separate from the act the criminal law seeks to
punish. Moreover, when courts award moral credit under the rubric of aberrant behavior, they open the door for actors with bad
characters to mimic the signs of good character-paying in advance, as it were, for the right to commit crimes at a reduced cost.
A settled-dispositions interpretation of the aberrant behavior de-

" The theoretical and philosophical flaws in the majority view are compounded by its
mistaken legal conclusion that the current system of criminal sentencing mandates an

act-based approach. This assumption is wrong in light of Congress's instruction that
courts should consider a defendant's history and characteristics along with the nature and
circumstances of the offense. 18 USC § 3553(aXl). It also conflicts with the Commission's
statement that, in contemplating a departure, "the court may consider, without limitation,
any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant.L "
USSG § lB1.4. Finally, the Supreme Court offers a reminder in Koon that courts should
focus on individual characteristics and circumstances. 518 US at 113. See also Part IIDA
"See note 2.
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parture thus may actually obscure character, thereby rewarding
the calculating and the devious.
C. Proposing a Motivational Character-Based Definition for
Aberrant Behavior
Judicial analysis of aberrant behavior must look beyond the
actor's capacity for rational choice and examine the actor's underlying emotions and motivations. At the same time, a sentencing court must eschew consideration of charitable activities, prior
good deeds, lack of previous misbehavior,93 history of steady employment, and history of economic support for family. Indeed,
Sentencing Commission policy statements already discourage
courts from using most of these factors as grounds for departure.9
A character-based approach to the aberrant behavior departure should focus instead on the motivations for the criminal act.
On at least one occasion the Ninth Circuit has done just this: the
court recognized that "a defendant's exemplary life prior to his
criminal involvement does not, by itself, justify a departure for
aberrant behavior" and examined the totality of the circumstances for the defendant's "motivations and any surrounding extenuating circumstances."9 5 Under the Ninth Circuit approach,
the proper standard of comparison is not the defendant's own
prior conduct but rather the behavior and motivations of other offenders committing the same offense. Only the latter comparison
reveals the presence or absence of a gap between legal and moral
norms that would justify an aberrant behavior departure. A particular defendant deserves a reduced sentence not because he is a
hard-worker, a family man, and usually a law-abiding citizen;
rather, he deserves a reduced sentence because the motivations
behind his crime make him less morally blameworthy than most
others who have committed the same offense.
For example, a defendant convicted of possessing an illegal
shotgun might qualify for the departure because his motive of
family protection distinguished him froi the ordinary gun offender.96 A defendant who bribed an immigration official might
qualify, too, if she committed her act in order to help a friend
The Guidelines, of course, already account for criminal history on the sentencing

grid itself. While this is unobjectionable, courts should not go beyond "official" criminal
history to measure the nature and quality of all the defendant's previous acts, punished or
unpunished.

USSG § 5H.
United States v Pierson, 121 F3d 560,564 (9th Cir 1997).
"See United States v Lam, 20 F3d 999, 1005 (9th Cir 1994).
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while most other defendants who commit the same offense act for
personal or pecuniary gain.9 Even Russell's spontaneous and
thoughtless act could bring him within the reach of the departure
if the sentencing court determined that his opportunistic motive
made him less morally culpable than a defendant demonstrating
calculating greed. A properly constructed character-based approach to the aberrant behavior departure would allow a scope of
inquiry just broad enough to generate these kind of moral judgments while avoiding the problem of "moral credit."
D. The Problem of Inaccurate Moral Judgments
A possible objection to the character-based approach to sentencing arises from another perceived gap between morality and
legal institutions-the gap between society's definition of moral
blame and moral blame as individual judges define it.98 In other
words, how can we be certain that individual judges make sentencing decisions that are consonant with society's moral intuitions? Professors Dan Kahan and Martha Nussbaum illustrate
this problem with the example of a Texas state court judge, Jack
Hampton, who imposed a lenient sentence on a killer because his
two victims were homosexual. 99 According to Judge Hampton, the
victims would not have been killed "if they hadn't been cruising
the streets picking up teen-age boys. "1"c Judge Hampton also indicated that he took into account the fact that the defendant had
no criminal record, was attending college, and was reared in a
good home by a police officer father.'' Predictably, the judge's decision caused outrage in the community and among gay rights
groups nationwide.' 2 Soon after the sentencing, Judge Hampton
reported that he had received death threats and had been advised
by the police to leave town. 03

A character-based approach to sentencing would deny people
like Judge Hampton the ability to afford a defendant moral credit
for factors such as lack of a criminal record, college attendance,
and family background. However, because it would permit him to
give weight to a defendant's emotions and motivations--in this
See United States v Takai, 941 F2d 738, 743 (9th Cir 1991).
See Kahan and Nussbaum, 96 Colum L Rev at 362 (cited in note 34) (describingand dismissing as unpersuasive-this objection to judges' and juries' examination of the
moral quality of offenders' emotions).
" See id at 364.
"ULisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of 2 Homosexuals, NY Times 8
(Dec 17, 1988).
1o1
Id.
"'Id.
'Id.

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:975

case homophobia-a character-based approach would risk that a
judge will get it wrong and apply a standard of morality inconsistent with that of society at large. There are several responses to
this problem. First, the problem will not arise often because departures from Guidelines-prescribed sentencing ranges are the
° Second, the entire criminal law system
exception, not the rule.'O
is based on the fundamental assumption that legislative and judicial decisionmakers are equipped to make accurate moral assessments. °5 Finally, the limited exercise of judicial discretion
under the Guidelines is constrained by the existence of appellate
review. District court judges must enumerate specific reasons for
departure, at the risk of being reversed."°
CONCLUSION

The United States Sentencing Guidelines seek to provide
uniformity in criminal punishment, ensuring that similar cases
are treated similarly. Because legal norms usually represent
moral norms accurately, this approach generally succeeds in fixing punishment in proportion to moral blame. Problems occur at
the margins where the unusual case presents itself and the
Guidelines force us to punish a defendant more severely than our
moral intuitions tell us is necessary. To alleviate this problem,
the Guidelines include provisions for departure from the sentencing grid, allowing limited exercises of judicial discretion to
align legal and moral norms. In order to align these norms perfectly, however, it is necessary to know where the gaps are.
Should courts focus on impairment of choice when assessing
moral culpability? Or is it the assessment of character that drives
moral intuitions?
Choice theory fails as an explanation for criminal responsibility because it is irremediably incomplete. Only character theory, which embraces instinctive considerations of unchosen emotions and motivations, provides a complete picture. If departures
such as the one for aberrant behavior are to identify and fill the
gaps between legal and moral judgments, the judicial inquiry
must be tightly focused on the motivational components of an ac"See Michael S. Gelacak, Ilene N. Nagel, and Barry L. Johnson, Departures Under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:An Empirical & JurisprudentialAnalysis, 81 Minn L
Rev 299, 359 (1996) (The national average for downward departures is about 6 percent.);
United States Sentencing Commission, 1995 Annual Report 85-86 (1995) (Between 1989
and 1995, the annual departure rates for all factors other than assistance to the government ranged from 5.8 to 8.4 percent.).
" See note 98.
18 USC § 3553(c).
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tor's character. The inquiry must therefore be neither limited to
choice nor expanded to include moral credit for past action. Instead, the sentencing judge must examine the most reliable expressions of character before her: the emotions and motivations
underlying the criminal act itself. The resulting decision to depart will thus achieve the desired alignment between morality

and legality.
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